CHAPTER TWO
SOME REASONS FOR ESSENCE BLINDNESS
W. A. Landman
1. INTRODUCTION
Fundamental Pedagogics is a particular form
of essence-pedagogics. It is the science
of the pedagogic situation as such
and one of its tasks is to reveal pedagogical fundamentalia. This means
that particular structural moments of the pedagogic situation, also known as
pedagogical essences, have to be disclosed.
From the nature of its assigned task, Fundamental Pedagogics is
characterized by anti-essence blindness.
Because of its anti-essence blindness,
Fundamental Pedagogics requires an essence-disclosing method, thus a phenomenological method. This method is the access to real
pedagogical essences. It is an access
that only is meaningful if it leads to ontological understanding, thus to
understanding real pedagogical essences against the universal life world itself
as the background for understanding. It
is an access or way that is possible because of implementing categories(1) and that also has to meet two particular requirements:
(a) the scientific necessity of the
essence-disclosing steps of thinking. A
step of thinking is scientifically necessary if it makes an indisputable
contribution to essence-disclosure and the verification of essence status.(2)
(b) philosophy of life permissibility of
the steps of thinking. For a
Christian, a step of thinking is permissible if its implementation is in
agreement with the demands of propriety that speak from his Bible-founded
philosophy of life.(3)
The phenomenological method is characterized
by anti-essence blindness. Since the real pedagogical essences are not
and cannot be isolated from each other, a phenomenologist necessarily has to
apply the hermeneutic method.(4) The hermeneutic method is a method for disclosing meaningful relationships
and as such can be described as the way to the hermeneutic question. This means that it is asked of every essence:
"What end is served by this
essence?" In other words, for which
other essences is this essence a precondition?
The answer to these
questions is a description of a relationship and in this way there also is a
further interpretation of an essence.
The hermeneutic method also is
characterized by anti-essence blindness because its application assumes
previous essence disclosure and then disclosing essential relationships.
For understanding the event of educating still
another method necessarily is applied by which there can be clarity about the
ways in which essence actualization occurs--a method for disclosing the ways in
which essences are actualized is necessary.
Here there is reference to the dialectic
method(5) that is a
method for implementing hermeneutic questions. The first hermeneutic question is "What
end is served by these particular essences?" and a movement from a first
to a second possibility (way of being) is actualized. The second hermeneutic question is "What
purpose is served by these two essences jointly, thus in their
integratedness?" and a movement to synthesis is actualized.
In addition, the dialectic method is an
inadequate method for disclosing essences because it only shows that an essence
that serves as a first possibility (way of being), in a particular course of
actualization, is inadequate for actualizing the essence which holds true as
its synthesis, and indicates that the intensified actualization of a second
possibility (essence) is necessary for this synthesis.(6) With the help of the
dialectic method it also is disclosed that the ways of actualization can occur
in various ways, e.g., by design, tension, intensification, life philosophy,
etc.(7)
Thus, the dialectic method is one that discloses the ways of
actualization.
As a method for disclosing the ways of
actualization, it requires that it be anti-essence blindness because it
involves the actualization of essences.
Regarding these three mentioned methods,
the following additional comments are made:
(a) the phenomenological method is
hermeneutic in nature because disclosing essences already is a form of
interpretation;
(b) the dialectic method also is
hermeneutic in nature because it is possible to ask hermeneutic questions
through it;
(c) the sequence of method application is
phenomenological/ hermeneutical/dialectical;
(d) all of the pedagogical disciplines are
forms of essence-pedagogics and require these anti-essence blind methods for
their development (supplemented by
other relevant methods).
SUMMARY
(1)
FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS = a particular form of essence- pedagogics.
= science
of the pedagogic
situation
as such.
= anti-essence blindness.
(2)
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
METHOD = essence-disclosing.
= access
to real pedagogical
essences.
= access that is only
meaningful
if it leads to
ontological
understanding.
= access or way that is
possible
because of implementing categories.
= way that must satisfy
particular
demands:
(1) scientific necessity;
(2) philosophy of life
permissibility.
= anti-essence blindness
(3)
HERMENEUTIC METHOD = method for disclosing
relationships.
= way to the hermeneutic
question.
= way to further interpretation.
= anti-essence blindness.
(4)
DIALECTIC METHOD = method
for disclosing ways of actualizing essences.
= method
for implementing hermeneutic
questions.
= inadequate
method for
disclosing
essences.
= method
for disclosing ways of
movement.:
(i) Design;
(ii) Tension;
(iii) Intensifying;
(iv) Philosophy of life, etc.
= anti-essence blindness.
Characteristic of Fundamental Pedagogics
and the three methods it uses is their anti-essence
blindness. Therefore, it is
meaningful to discuss some reasons for essence blindness:
(1) Lack of light
(2) General talk [Idle talk]
(3) Superficial curiosity
(4) Ambiguity
(5) Negativity
(6) Timid thinking
(7) Naive bias
(8) Lack of wakefulness
(9) Caricaturisms
2.
REASONS FOR ESSENCE BLINDNESS
(1)
Lack of light
It belongs essentially to the educative
event that it can be unlocked(8) through
reflection (scientific thinking), i.e., it is characteristic of educating that
its real essences can be disclosed--a scientific activity that cannot be
practiced meaningfully with a lack of light.
With a lack of light the matter of educating cannot be adequately
reached and disclosed and its essentials known--essence blindness makes its
appearance.(9) Light allows one to differentiate and
compile that which can be distinguished more sharply and clearly.(10) Pedagogical essences as
particular structural moments of the reality of education's inseparability
because of a lack of light cannot be differentiated and essence blindness
becomes possible; also compiling the essences, thus ordering and seeing
relationships no longer are possible.
Thus, essence blindness leads to not understanding what is essential to the
pedagogic.
With a lack of light, opening an aspect of
reality (e.g., the reality of educating) becomes difficult or even impossible,
that is, the event of bringing to light by which something (e.g., pedagogical
essences) can appear, can come into the clearness of light, cannot be
actualized meaningfully.(11) To allow a
presence (e.g., of pedagogical essences) to occur requires opening (verb) by
which appearing occurs. With a lack of
light or insufficient light, opening, as the creation of an illuminated area in
which a presence is given, cannot be actualized adequately.(12) In this sense opening refers to creating ways of
access to real pedagogical essences and a lack of light means a lack of the
means of illuminating that the ways of access have to create. Essence blindness, then, really is either a
lack of knowing or the denial of the scientific necessity of pedagogical
categories.(13)
(2)
General talk [Idle talk]
Sometimes one listens to talk, as such,
without arriving at an authentic understanding.
This has to do merely with the fact that there is talk and the truth of
a matter is accepted because someone says so.
What is said has authority.
Everything is understood but nothing is grasped.(14) Under the flow of words
essence blindness flourishes and then the pedagogical essences disappear because
they are covered over with a blanket of words.
The covering blanket of words accosts one because it is so easily
understandable and, therefore, is accepted as truth. Authentic knowledge, as adequate knowledge of
essences, as the structural moments of pedagogic situations that cannot be
thought away (are necessary), is absent.
General talk that can be taken up by each
and everyone exempts them from the task of authentically understanding. This can lead to the assumption that
everything is understood well(15) and the way
of least resistance, namely, the way of essence blindness is proclaimed as the
way to truth. Essence disclosing is the
arduous way from which general talkers distance themselves with still more
general talk.
(3)
Superficial curiosity
Curiosity is characterized by a desire to
see not for the sake of understanding but only for the seeing. There is a search for the new, not to linger
with it but to jump immediately to something else.(16) This means that superficial
curiosity is particularly impressed by the non-essential that even is seen as
the truth. The non-essentials as the
ever new are continually searched for and essence blindness is fallen into and
one is not in a position to see the essences as persisting structural moments. Leaping from one non-essential to a new
non-essential is not conducive for thinking to linger with the reality of
educating itself that is a precondition for overcoming essence blindness and
for opening up the reality of educating so that real pedagogical essences can
appear there.
A way of superficial curiosity is to
quickly explain that a matter (e.g., educating) is mysterious and, therefore,
is not accessible to essence disclosing thinking. Someone such as de Vos shows strikingly that
the experience of the mysterious is the primary perception when wondering is
awakened. Then, however, the desire is
awakened to eliminate the absolute strangeness of the mysterious by, e.g.,
asking meaningful questions. However,
this does not mean that a mystery (which educating is) can be reduced to a
solvable problem because generally there remains a mysterious left over.(17) The fact that there always
remains some mystery left over does not discourage the essence thinker and
allow him to fall into essence blindness because there always is a remainder
that is accessible to essence disclosing thinking that indeed is graspable.
(4)
Ambiguity
If it is impossible to decide what is
disclosed in genuine understanding and what is not, there is mention of
ambiguity. For example, the impression
is given that what superficial curiosity is directed to and about which there
is general talk is the authentic, while in this way reality (the reality of
educating) itself becomes pushed into the background. Ambiguity conceals(18) the essences and promotes essence blindness. For ambiguity essence disclosure is
impossible and needless and it merely is word play.
It is ambiguity that feeds superficial
curiosity and gives to general talk the semblance of final conclusions.(19) Ambiguity, superficial
curiosity and general talk have already reached final conclusions about what
educating is and find a continual thinking search for pedagogical essences
needless and even meaningless. Such
essence blindness, because of ambiguity, also does not really illuminate what
the matter is, thus what is founded in experience itself.(20)
Fundamental Pedagogics' struggle against
ambiguity and the correlated essence blindness seems to emphasize the clear
formulation and systematic construction of the conceptual structure unique to the Pedagogic along with emphasizing
the meaning and fundamental nature of the subject terminology (concepts) for
the unambiguous understanding of the Pedagogic, in the first place, but also
for the self-respect of the practitioners of Pedagogics.
Clearly, a science demands that its building blocks, namely, the concepts
as expressed in and by the subject terminology, have to be fixed exactly so
that their meaning and contents can be determined unambiguously. Unambiguous
determination means that ambiguity and superficiality are eliminated. The premise that any concept can be used that
expresses only approximately what is meant has to be rejected summarily since
such a view decidedly leads to ambiguity and thus to essence blindness. As far as possible, concepts have to
correspond to the essentials, i.e., to the real essentials of the reality to
which they are directed. A Pedagogician
subsequently has to strive continually to have his concepts convey the essences
as particular structural moments of the pedagogic distinctly and clearly so
that his conversational partners will know exactly what each concept used means
and implies. Distinctness indicates that each concept is able to be precisely
and positively distinguished from other concepts, while clarity means that the characteristics of each concept have to be
distinctly distinguished from each other.(21) Distinctness and clarity only can be effective if
essence-disclosure holds a lively interest.
(5)
Negativity
The untrue (that which does not correspond
to reality) produces negativity.(22) Refusing in whatever form at all to verify
all pronouncements about educating with the universal reality of educating
itself, thus to proceed to a phenomenological verification, leads to negativity
in the form of essence blindness. This
is the case because it is just pedagogical essences (with their relationships)
that have to be submitted to a phenomenological verification. In this sense the phenomenological steps of
thinking(23) also can be viewed as verification
steps that have to lead to overcoming essence blindness, especially by
verifying the essence-status of the structural moments of pedagogical
situations.
The negative essence blindness does not see
that pedagogical essences are the characteristics, i.e., the qualities of the
reality of educating and that without these qualities this reality will become
unreal,(24) that is to say, it will not become
what it is and ought to be. Essences are
expressions of structures and embody the being
such-and-such of the educative event.
Further, there are living characteristics(25) that cannot be expressed if essence blindness throws its negativity
over the reality of educating and then the pedagogic cannot be grasped
authentically.
(6)
Timid thinking
When there is a question of the task of
thinking there is a question of what concerns thinking. What is thinking concerned with? A contemporary answer: the matter itself. There is mention of thinking being called to the matter itself(26) while essence blindness, as timidity
in thinking is called to something else--usually unique thought constructions
or particular biases or superficialities or ambiguities or negativities or to
most effectively label thinkers with whom there is no agreement.
The matter itself has to appear and be present and such appearing occurs in a
clear light. There is mention of
elucidation in which the matter shows itself, thus appears there where openness
has won the battle over darkness,(27) as essence
disclosure conquering essence blindness.
This openness guarantees the access of thinking to what it reflects on
and this openness is called illumination,(28) which is not possible with essence blindness because of timid
thinking. This illumination is openness
for everything that is present and what is illuminated is what thinking attends
to,(29) and timid thinking cannot attend to this and thus falls into
essence blindness with its inability to penetrate to the eidos(30) (real essentials).
Illuminative thinking guarantees the
possibility of a way to the presence(31) of the real essentials while timid thinking guarantees hiddenness,
darkness and essence blindness.
Authentic thinking is observable as a
thinking through by which there is a disclosing of and being at the essences by
which the structuring of the phenomenon of educating becomes possible(32) while timid thinking is manifested as superficiality by which
obfuscation and concealment become possible.
In this sense authentic thinking is essence disclosing thought and timid
thinking is a form of essence blindness.
(7)
Naive bias
Thinking involves a struggle with naive
biases as superficial prejudices in order to promote perceptive knowledge of an
aspect of reality(33) and this also
includes a struggle to move away from essence blindness in the direction of
essence disclosure.
Conducive to this "movement away"
is that reflecting on, verbalizing and controlling inevitable presuppositions (assumptions and
presumptions) must occur. The character
of science, then, does not require that presuppositions have to be eliminated
but that the scientist has to be clearly aware of them.(34) For example, here one thinks
of the necessary presupposition that real pedagogical essences exist and that
it is possible to disclose them. Verification,
then, follows in the sense that attempts are made to bring essences to
light. If essences are disclosed the
presupposition that they exist and can appear becomes a fundamental axiom. Should a
pedagogician not succeed in showing in adequate ways and by verifying in terms
of the reality of educating itself what he has presupposed, his presupposition
merely is a naive bias. In this case,
the pedagogician has not defended all of his presuppositions but has investigated
them with the aim of verifying their fundamental axiomatic status. The essence blind generally do not succeed in
seeing the differences among bias/presupposition/fundamental axiom and then it
is difficult for them to begin thinking about the reality of educating itself
because of essence blinding prejudices.
In addition, they cannot avoid imposing their personal opinions on the
reality of educating(35) and this does not
allow it to be seen.
(8)
Lack of wakefulness
To work in scientifically accountable ways
requires a wakeful accessibility to the reality of educating that has to be
investigated. The degree of wakefulness
correlates with the quality of the access(36) to what is essential to the reality of educating. Essence blindness, as the absence of
wakefulness, then makes accessibility impossible or highly haphazard and this
leads to a deepening of the already existing blindness. Essence blindness excludes wakefulness and
thereby subdues the initiative(37) to proceed
to disclose essences. Subdued initiative
then leads again to a lack of wakefulness and sometimes to defective
wakefulness.
In this regard it is meaningful to note
that objectivism (elimination of the human from a person) and naturalism (a
human as an extension of nature) leave out wakefulness.(38) Therefore, it is well to
understand why those blind to essences so easily fall into an objectivism and
naturalism, although sometimes there are philosophy of life reasons for trying
hard not to do so. Here one thinks
especially of so-called "Christian" naturalism(39) that is not able to understand the pedagogic ontologically. In
this sense the concept "ontological" clearly refers to conquering
essence blindness by means of wakefulness.
Conquering essence blindness occurs by
interest (inter-esse = being among), thus being present to the reality of
educating itself in the form of a directedness(40) to it that has to be an essence disclosing directedness if its real
essentials will be grasped. There is a
position taken(41) with respect to the reality of
educating itself. It is a position of
essence disclosure by which the essential pedagogic is discerned. It is taking a position and attentiveness
that is lived(42) and that refers to a lively directedness to conquering essence
blindness with its passivity.
(9)
Caricaturisms
A caricaturist is someone who makes
caricatures(43) in the form of
misrepresentations. These
misrepresentations then are attacked enthusiastically and with emotional agitation and sometimes even passion. A caricaturism then in reality is a sham
fight (see Don Quixote) against fancied opponents that is carried out with
great intolerance and by which nothing really is achieved because the campaign
is carried out against something non-existent.
The caricature does not exist in reality and a struggle against it is
meaningless especially because of emotional flooding essence blindness is at
work. Examples of caricaturisms are
legion and only a few are mentioned:
(1) Phenomenologists are existentialists
and existentialists are atheists.
Therefore it is not permissible for a scientist who is Christian to
follow a phenomenological way. The
essence blind caricaturist does not see that:
(i) thinkers who fall into existentialism do so when they are untrue to the
phenomenological method;(44)
(ii) phenomenology carries out the most
effective struggle against existentialism
in all of its forms;(45) and
(iii) Christian pedagogicians apply the
phenomenological method because the steps of thinking comprising it demonstrate
that they are permissible by his life philosophy.(46)
(2) Sometimes there is an attempt to show
that phenomenology's view of human being's unnaturalness as ontologically
determined, is a suspicious proposition.
It is a particular contribution of existential thinking to show the
exceptional position of humans without falling into an existentialistic humanism.
With the same conviction shown by some Christians (Christian
naturalism!) in propagating the naturalness of humans, a Christian who is
acquainted with the philosophy of existence proclaims the unnaturalness of
humans because God had not created him a little better than an animal, but "For thou hast made him a little lower
than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honour" (Psalms 8 v.
5).
(3) The following remarks that this author
has made regarding a criticism of C. K. Oberholzer(47) are relevant to this section: "In light of this critic's
approach one can expect that his "critique" of Oberholzer primarily
is going to be a "denunciation".
This expectation was confirmed to a great degree and the question arises if the unfounded mistrust that
necessarily flows from this is justified.
This is not to say that the critic has no right to his own opinion and perspective but
drawing a caricature of existential thinking (not existentialism!) and then
assailing this caricature as though Oberholzer is an exponent of it is
scientifically unaccountable. Oberholzer
is no humanist and also will not and cannot be one. The child-centeredness proclaimed by the
circle that Oberholzer criticizes indeed is humanistic in nature and even
existentialistic! Related to this,
naiveté is not lacking in the critique, of which the following image certainly
is the worst: it is asserted that since Oberholzer has noted in the reality of
educating that at least two persons have to be present before there can be
mention of education, he views
humans numerically! Such an assertion is
diametrically opposed to all of Oberholzer's findings and, in addition, it can
be asked if then no persons have to be present for there to be an educational
situation! Also, this critic does not at
all see that criteria really are essential categories (essences) that are used
for evaluation and that to correctly understand this matter it is necessary to
realize that the contrast is not between the normative and descriptive but
rather between norm-description and norm-prescription, the latter has a
personal decision as its precondition and thus is an extra-scientific activity.
It must also be indicated that in the
so-called dialectic thinking of Oberholzer there is no mention of science as
thesis and the post-scientific as antithesis.
This would be the case only if with Oberholzer there is mention of an
absolute dialectic. For Oberholzer the
first pole and the second pole (thus, not an antithesis!) are in a relationship
of being, thus in a necessary relationship to each other. Consequently, here there is mention of
authentic synthesizing and not of synthetic thinking. Synthetic thinking is that mode of thinking,
for example, of Christian naturalism where irreconcilables are forced into a
synthesis such as, e.g., Thorndike's "law of effect" (which actually is a pathological principle)
and Biblical texts in which there is reference to happiness.
Clear distinctions among concepts, thus, are
not characteristic of this critic and in this way genuine confusion is created
and at the same time the scientific nature of Oberholzer's format is
unnecessarily disparaged because of caricature-representation.
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University of Pretoria, 1971.
- Landman, W. A. and Roos, S. G. Fundamentele Pedagogiek en die Opvoedingswerkliheid, Sect. [1,8], [2.11]
- Ibid, Sect. [2.1]
- Ibid, Sect. [2.3]
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- Landman, W. A. and Roos, S. G., op cit., Chapters three and four
- Ibid, Chapter three
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- Ibid, 214-219
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University of Pretoria, 1971
- Heidegger, M. Sein und Zeit, 167-168
- Ibid, 169
- Ibid, 170-173
- De Vos, H. De Filosofische Eros, 13-14. Wolters, Groningen, 1966
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- Ibid, 174
- Carnap, R. Schijnproblemen in de Filosofie, 34-36. Boon, Amsterdam, 1971
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- Landman, W. A., Roos, S. G. Fundamentele Pedagogiek en die Opvoedingswerklikheid,
Chapter two. Butterworths, Durban, 1973
- See van Peursen, C. A. Feiten, Waarden, Gebeurtenissen, 203-207. Kok, Kampen, 1972
- Ibid, 207-214
- Heidegger, M. Zur Sache des Denkens, 67. Max Niemeyer, Tubingen, 1969
- Ibid, 71
- Ibid, 71
- Ibid, 72
- Ibid, 74, 78
- Heidegger, M. Zur Sache des Denkens, 75, 76
- Ballauff, Th. Systematische Paedagogik, 15, 17, 19. Quelle & Meyer, Heidelberg, 1970
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Fordham University, New York
- Husserl, E. Logische Untersuchungen III, 201
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Tubingen, 1970
- Weber, M. Wetenschap als Beroep en Roeping, 23. Samson, Alphen an den Rijn 1970
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- Ibid, 4
- Ibid, 4-5, 9
- Landman, W. A., Roos, S. G., van Rooyen, R. P. op cit., Chapter two
- See Buytendijk, F. J. J. Prolegomena van een Antropologische Fysiologie, 109
- Ibid, 109
- Ibid, 109
- Schoonees, P. C. et al. Verklarende Handwoordeboek van die Afrikaanse Taal, 411 Voortrekkerpers,
Johannesburg, 1972
- Landman, W. A., Kilian, C. J. G., Roos, S. G., op cit., 110-114
- Ibid, Chapter five
- Landman, W. A., Kilian, C. J. G., Leesboek vir die Opvoedkundestudent en Onderwyser, 61-71. Juta and Kie,
Cape Town, 1972.
- Landman, W. A., Roos, S. G. op cit., Chapter two
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D. Phil. dissertation, Bloemfontein, 1971